How we protect your data

This page explains, without fine print, what DT Vault does to protect your account and your saved passwords — and also what it doesn't do, so you can decide with real information whether it works for what you need to store.

What we do

Server-side encryption

Each entry in your vault (username, password, notes) is encrypted with AES-256-GCM before being saved to the database, using an encryption key that is unique and random for each account — no one shares a key with another user.

Mandatory two-step verification

All accounts must activate an authenticator (Google Authenticator, Microsoft Authenticator, or similar) to be able to sign in. Email and password alone are not enough.

Master passwords with Argon2id

Your access password is never stored: a hash calculated with Argon2id is stored instead, the algorithm currently recommended for this use. It cannot be "reversed" to recover the original password.

Brute-force attempt throttling

If we detect many consecutive failed login attempts — from one account or from the same connection — we temporarily block the following attempts.

Quick access with fingerprint, face, or PIN

Biometric unlock uses the WebAuthn standard: your fingerprint or face never leaves your device, and it only works in the browser where you activated it.

End-to-end encrypted connection

All traffic between your browser and the server travels over HTTPS. Session cookies are marked as secure and not accessible from JavaScript.

What we don't do (yet)

DT Vault is not "zero-knowledge". In a zero-knowledge password manager (like Bitwarden or 1Password), the key that encrypts your vault is derived from your master password in your browser, and the server never gets to have it: not even the service provider can read your data even if they wanted to.

In DT Vault, today, the key that encrypts each vault is generated on the server and also stored on the server (itself encrypted with a general application key). This has a practical advantage — if you forget your password, you can recover access to your vault without losing your saved passwords — but it means that, in the extreme case that someone compromises the server and that general key, they could technically be able to decrypt vaults. We prefer to say this plainly rather than promise something the current design doesn't guarantee.

We've already hardened the points that matter most while we evaluate moving to a zero-knowledge scheme (error display disabled in production, login attempt limits, Argon2id hashing, authenticated AES-GCM encryption). If we ever migrate to encryption derived from your password in the browser, we'll announce it here.

What you can do

Questions, or something doesn't add up with what you read here? Write to us via Contact.